Biography
Daniel Quint earned his Bachelor's degree in economics from Harvard University in 1997, followed by a PhD from Stanford University in 2007. Since then, he's taught at the University of Wisconsin-Madison (2007-present) and also held visiting fellow and faculty positions at the European University Institute in Florence, Italy (2015) and at the University of Tokyo (2022-2023). A gifted instructor, at the University of Wisconsin he has been twice honored with the "Best First-Year Teacher Award" in the PhD sequence, received the "Distinguished Honors Faculty Award" and three times been recognized with the student initiated award of "Honored Instructor."
In his research, Dr. Quint specializes in Microeconomic Theory and Industrial Organization. His work has been published in numerous journals including, but not limited to, International Economic Review, RAND Journal of Economics, Journal of Econometrics, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, Journal of Economic Theory and Econometrica.
Student Lecture: 12 October 2023
Markets, Platforms, and Lessons from History
Much trade today occurs on large, two-sided platforms where buyers and sellers meet to trade. We will explore a historical example of this phenomenon — brokers who facilitated trade with visiting merchants in medieval Europe cities. I'll use a theoretical model to understand what brokerage rules are predicted to perform better, and present empirical evidence that city leaders largely "got it right".Faculty Seminar: 13 October 2023
"Bid Shopping" in procurement Auctions with Subcontracting
We analyze the equilibrium effects of "bid shopping" – a contractor soliciting a subcontractor bid for part of a project prior to a procurement auction, then showing that bid to a competing subcontractor in an attempt to secure a lower price. Such conduct is criticized as unethical by many professional organizations, and has been the target of legislation at both the federal and state level, but is widespread in procurement auctions in many places. Our baseline model shows that bid shopping increases total surplus when subcontractors' bid preparation costs are sufficiently high; but bid shopping can be welfare-negative when bid preparation costs are low, and has complex distributional effects.